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BOOK REVIEWS
If Men Were Angels. By JEROmE It.RANK.
Harper and Brothers. 1942. Pp. xii, 380.

New York and London:

A rate regulation case [Gas Public Service Company v. Texas, 303 U. S.
123, 58 Sup. Ct. 483 (1938)] coming to the Supreme Court from Texas
five years ago presented, judicial review of administrative findings from such
a surprising aspect as to afford some innocent merriment. The statute had
said that one dissatisfied with orders of the state railroad commission might
resort to the county court-sitting with a jury. The trial was de novo. The
jury heard testimony concerning property values, depreciation reserve accrual, and the like; they were duly charged as to fair return, fair value, reproduction cost need, and so on; then they were required to find whether
the rate scale was or was not reasonable and just. They found that it was. A
silly business of course; but it was an independent judicial determination
of the very question at issue, which is what the Ben Avon Borough case
[253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1920)] required. The spirit of Henry
II-who was one of the really great creators in the history of public administration-might marvel that our political inventiveness had been so inadequate to the complexities of our economy. We have hit upon specialized regulatory bodies as a response to our need; but as is illustrated in the case just
cited, their harmonious relation to other parts of the government is still to be
attained. Yet we know there are strategic points which will be controlled,
if not by administrative authorities responsible to the public, then by private
management responsible to itself. No one with the least historical perspective
can doubt that regulatory commissions are a permanent feature of our governmental system. Name-calling and attempted sabotage merely lose time
from the serious business of improving their performance.
Such as have ears for a reasoned discussion of the topic will be interested
in what Jerome Frank has to say in If Men Were Angels. To at least three
large groups the book is particularly to be recommended. The practitioner
will find here good lawyers' talk with illustrations from the history of the
common law. The serious-minded layman can follow the discussion, which is
popular without being loose, and sprightly without being smart. University
professors will welcome an addition to the short list of readable books on
regulatory commissions for students in government. judge Frank brings to
the inquiry the rational spirit of Jeremy Bentham; but beside the zeal for
reform there is an evident zest in controversial discourse.
The argument opens with a paradox of our political credo: the clamor
for a "government of laws" really serves to distract attention from the
possibilities of sinister purposefulness in the judicial administration of law.
"The thorough awareness that there is an unavoidable personal factor
in government is the best way to reduce to a minimum the bad effects
of that personal factor." (p. 5)
The discussion then swings tothe characteristics of administrative adjudication and its superiority to judicial adjudication for certain types of problem.
128

1942]

BOOK REVIEWS

Judge Frank writes out of his own experience as an active practitioner who
later served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. His
illustrations of administrative procedures are drawn almost wholly from the
S.E.C. With other federal agencies, one infers, the story would be much
the same. The standards prevalent in state tribunals are not touched upon.
For the law of the courts he goes, not to the nice refinements of appellate
judges, but to the crude realities of trial courts and jury verdicts. "Courthouse 'Facts' ", chapter VII, tells what almost every lawyer knows, yet by
polite convention affects to ignore. Professors of law are reminded that
"regardless of how much the legal rules may be clarified, there can be scant
improvement in the administration of justice unless courtroom fact finding
is bettered." (p. 106)
"The most effective way, then, to nullify, as far as possible the evil
aspects of the 'personal element' in decision making is for each judge to
know well his own weaknesses. But if judges continue to be told, and
to believe, that there is no personal element in the judicial process--or
that adherence to legal rules will alone, in any large measure, serve to
offset it-then that personal element is likely to affect decisions to a
larger extent than is necessary. For, to repeat, it is in 'fact finding' that
the 'personal' element is chiefly operative; and the legal rules (no matter
how fixed and certain they may be) play little direct part in fact finding."
(p. 111)
After contemplating some of these less inspiring vistas of the law as administered in the courts one is invited to cross the street to admire "How
Commissions Find Facts" (c. IX). Jerome Frank is no dogmatist: he is
not an "either-or" thinker, but an advocate of "both-and". "We want some
of this and also some of that, which makes nice distinctions and differentiations." Beware, he warns, of perfectionism-the "positive perfectionist"
who seeks the impossible in the hard business of governing, and still more
the "negative perfectionist" who would "defeat any particular charge by
falsely claiming that its proponents claim perfection. .

.

. Many critics of

the administrative agencies are negative perfectionists." (pp. 135, 136) The
conclusion of the chapter is in fact the thesis of the book:
"The situation facing us, then, is this: Administrative agencies, in
general, are just as painstaking and impartial in their fact finding as are
courts. They have, in addition, the advantage of expert investigative
staffs to assist in preparing and presenting cases before them. Knowing
well the characters and abilities of the men who compose those staffs,
they can place in them a degree of reliance and confidence that a judge
frequently cannot place in the opposing advocates on whose presentation
of the evidence he must largely rest his decision. The administrative
agency, therefore, is an instrument of government which has in it great
powers of good; instead of leaving the public interest to be served adventitiously by the private parties, it offers an affirmative and purposeful
way of insuring that, fo a considerable extent, the revelant facts will be
brought out, the public's interest made clear and justice done. But false
and unjustified attacks on administrative justice tend to make adminis-
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trative agencies excessively legalistic and timid, thus curtailing their efficiency and with no counterbalancing benefit." (pp. 146-47)
In the remaining chapters the author fastens a critical gaze upon such
catch-words as delegation, separation of powers, judicial review, rule and
discretion. When we quote Coke and his contemporaries we should remember that the Parliamentary leaders and Whig historians did not always treat
the precedents with uberrinm fides. It is, moreover, a far cry from the wilful
prerogative of the Stuart kings to the public policy formulated by a federal
administrative tribunal in a context of limited and responsible government.
"So we conclude where we began: We need efficient governmental
machinery. But, in a democracy, we must also insist upon a government
of laws well administered by the right kind of men. If we do not select
such men, men who have both faith in democracy and the ability to make
it efficient-at the same time avoiding the arbitrary use of power to invade those civil liberties which are the essence of democracy-may God
help us. And let us not forget, that, usually, God helps them who are
able and willing to help themselves." (p. 264)
In the mechanics of arranging a book of this sort the author must choose
between several possibilities, no one of which is ideal. Heavy footnotes will
discourage the general reader; on the other hand, it is vexatious to be constantly invited to turn to the back in the hope that of the notes gathered
there this particular citation will prove significant. Judge Frank decided
upon a yet more complicated arrangement, with some footnotes, other notes
collected at the back, and eight appendices besides. The scheme gets off to
a bad start. In the first paragraph one comes to the word "law" and trips
upon a citation to the footnotes. The footnote points to chapter notes at the
end of the book. The chapter note says that "law" is ambiguous: See Appendix V. Appendix V tells of a running fight between "realists" or "observa'tionists" and their critics. One gives up the chase and returns to the starting
point, resolved to withstand the lure of the asterisks.
A controversial note pervades the book, to a degree which may detract
from its persuasiveness. In part this reflects a consciousness that administrators have been the objects of calculated misrepresentation. Much of the
criticism has been neither disinterested nor candid. Judge Frank shows how
this extraneous consideration enters into the deliberations of a commissioner:
he bends over backwards to prevent even an unjust aspersion upon the integrity of the administrative process. In so far as the polemical spirit is
symptomatic of the state of mind of administrators, it is a matter of public
concern. In so far as it expresses a personal desire to confound critics of
his earlier writings, that is the author's own affair. In any disputation he is
amply able to take care of himself. In writing the book he has earned for
himself the tribute which in his dedicatory note he pays to Mr. Justice
Douglas; he has "demonstrated that effective administration can be made an
important instrument of true democracy."
Major Charles Fairnurn*
Washington, D. C.
*Major, J.A.G.D.
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The Rule Against Perpetuities. By JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY. Fourth Edition by Roland Gray. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1942. Pp. xcv, 895.
Among my recollections of student days in law school is the remark of a
professor that Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities is the only American text
that has attained a recognition as authority in any way comparable to that
accorded in an earlier day to Coke's Institutes. Since its first appearance,
namely in 1886, Gray's work has been an indispensable guide for American
lawyers through the intricacies of a highly technical subject. By reason of its
content-a concise, perspicuous and often highly original analysis of cases
and doctrine-and of its distinguished style, it has long been an exemplar of
legal text writing. Indeed the influence of the book in the growth of our law
is less a subject for comment than that here and there decisions of great importance on property matters are made in apparent ignorance of the common law
as Gray expounded it. Thus in 1919 it was decided in California that rights
of entry for condition broken were not subject to the Rule against Perpetuities because-so the opinion reads-a right of entry "is in the nature of a
reversion" and is vested. 1 Gray, on the other hand, lays it down plainly that
rights of entry are not reversionary and do not vest until breach of the condition2 and he says, admitting that the American cases do not follow him, that
rights of entry are within the spirit and the letter of the Rule against
Perpetuities.3
It would be a pity if Gray's text, through lack of revision, had been allowed
to follow Kent, Story and Greenleaf into illustrious desuetude. Fortunately,
through the labors of his son, Roland Gray, Esq., of the Boston Bar, the third
edition of 1915 has now been brought up to date. The masterpiece, now
splendidly revised, continues, therefore, to be an invaluable resource for the
profession. Footnotes have been enlarged to take in all cases of any consequence, so far as appears, decided since the third edition and also to take in
references to a large amount of law review material, the Restatements, and
certain other texts, particularly Simes on Future Interests and Bogert and
Scott, respectively, on Trusts. Apparently to save space, ddtes of cases have
been omitted and in citing legal periodicals, authors' names and titles of
articles have been left out, and no distinction has been indicated between
articles and comments. This is regrettable. For the most part the editor
has chosen to retain the original text adding in the footnotes concise and
important comment.
Gray, of course, wrote in the spirit of the historical jurists, his aim being to
find "the law" by careful analysis of decided cases. The resulting text is
highly dogmatic and by no means in the spirit of more recent jurisprudence.
Indeed in the preface to the first edition Gray declared:
"In many legal discussions there is, in the last resort, nothing to say
but that one judge or writer thinks one way, and another writer or judge
thinks another way. There is no exact standard to which appeal can be
'Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919).
2§§ 30, 31, 114. Section references, unless otherwise indicated, are to GRAY's RULE
AGAINST PERPETUrITES (4th ed. 1942).

a§ 304.
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made. In questions of remoteness this is not so; there is for them a
definite recognized rule: if a decision agrees with it, it is right; if it does
not agree with It,it is wrong. In no part of the law is the reasoning so
mathematical in its character; none has so small a human element.
A degree of dogmatism, therefore, may be permitted here which would
be unbecoming in other branches of the law."
I should personally have welcomed a revision done in a different spirit, one
which would have laid hold of the text itself in many places so as to introduce
a functional rather than a merely logical or historical critique of case law.
Such a revision would have been, en rapport with the approach of outstanding
contributions to property-law learning in recent years, such as the article of
Professor Powell on determinable fees 4 and of Professor Simes on future
interests in chattels. 5 The able editor might, I feel, have profited from a
reading of Professor McDougal's trenchant, but certainly not overgenerous,
criticism 6 of the third volume of the Restatement of Property had that criti-

cism been available before publication of the present book. This is not to say
that an atmosphere of "social engineering" with resulting uncertainties would
endear a text on property law to practitioners or law students. But those
judges, and they are not few, who in deciding future-interest cases grasp at
precedent with the uncritical enthusiasm of a drowning man for a rope, might
profit by being constantly reminded of the classic answer of Lord Nottingham
to the common-law judges of his day in a case which laid the foundation of the
Rule against Perpetuities itself.7 When asked where he would stop if not
with Child v. Bayly he said: "I will tell you where I will stop; I will stop
wherever any visible inconvenience doth appear."
One who is so brash as to suggest the need for streamlining an Olympian
vehicle like Gray should support himself by illustration. Space will perhaps
permit mention of three instances, two from the original text and one from
the editor's notes.
(1) In taking up various types of interests to which the Rule against
Perpetuities applies the author states flatly that options to purchase the fee,
contained in leases for years are bad under the Rule if exercisable at too
remote a time.8 As the footnotes reveal, there is considerable American
authority contra. By contrast with such options the author defends covenants
for perpetual renewal, contained in leases for years. 9 Here the authorities
for the most part support him. The cases have generally declared such covenants valid as exceptions to the Rule but Gray prefers to treat them not as
exceptions, but as "part of the lessee's present interest." It is plain that on
technical grounds both options to purchase and covenants for perpetual renewal may be analyzed as types of powers of appointment, that is, powers to
create future interests. So treated, the options and covenants in question
4(1923) 23
5(1930) 39
6(1942) 55
7
The Duke
8§ 230.3.
9§ 230.

COL. L. REv. 207.
YALE L. J. 771.
HARV. L. Ray. 1077.
of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 26 (1682).
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would be bad if the resulting powers were exercisable at too remote a time.
On the other hand, should it not be suggested, at least in jurisdictions where
the validity of such options and covenants is not yet fully determined, that the
matter ought to be examined in the light of the current use made of these
interests in the jurisdiction in question and the economic purposes which they
serve. It is plain upon a minute's thought that options to purchase the fee
have at least this much justification, in common with covenants for perpetual
renewal, namely, that they provide an incentive for improvement of the freehold by the tenant for years.
(2) Suppose a devise of realty to A and his heirs, but if A shall ever enter
the saloon business, then to B and his heirs. A, after going into possession
of the land, enters the saloon business. B, however, has predeceased the
testator so that the executory limitation to him fails. Will A's fee nevertheless devest for the benefit of the heir? Yes, in this country, so the editor
declares, if sufficient intent appears that A should lose his estate regardless of
the validity of the gift over.10 The condition subsequent will be read as a
special limitation upon A's fee and the latter, being thus construed as a determinable fee, will cease when the special limitation becomes effective. Suppose, however, that the gift over fails not by way of lapse, as above, but
because it is invalid under the Rule against Perpetuities. Suppose for instance a devise to M Corporation in fee, but if M Corporation shall ever engage
in the liquor business, then to the first grandson of Henry (a bachelor) and
his heirs. Here, if I understand the editor, it cannot be found that the fee
of M Corporation is to devest if the M Corporation enters the liquor business,
the gift over to the grandson being too remote. This is because the traditional
formula for creating a special limitation rather than a condition subsequent
was not used (of course it also was not used in the former case) and when
the gift over fails because of the Rule against Perpetuities, "it is generally
agreed ...

the prior fee is never terminated except where it is expressly made

subject to a special limitation by language appropriate for that purpose."'"
Undoubtedly there are text-writers and perhaps some case law to sustain
the difference in result in the two cases just put, that difference springing
entirely from the ground on which the gift over fails. If there is any sense,
however, in this difference in result, the edftor does not point it out. Should
the editor, therefore, lend the imprimatur of so distinguished a text, without
qualification, to the perpetuation of the distinction?
(3) The Rule against Perpetuities as Gray conceived it has a most inflexible
prospective operation. That is, to satisfy the Rule it is not enough that a
future interest may vest or even that it probably will vest within the limits of
the rule. If the contingency "can possibly happen beyond those limits an
interest conditioned on it is too remote."' 2 Far from suggesting any relaxation of this sadistic requirement, the editor lays it down that even if subsequent events cause the interest to vest within the limits of the Rule before the
question of the validity of the interest is presented for judicial consideration,
3o§

788 and note 2 thereunder.

788, note 2.
12§ 214.
11§
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the interest is nevertheless invalid, and he disapproves a New Hampshire
case to the contrary. 13 It is not argued in the text that the policy behind the
Rule requires the application of the judicial guillotine, blind both to probabilities and to events since the inception of the transfer. Ought there not to
be at least a suggestion that here is a matter worth exploration? Scholarly
criticism assailed the prospective application of the Rule many years ago. 14
Having pointed out places where I regret the dogmatic approach, I must
in fairness add that there are some instances in which the editor has interposed
admirably to modify the conceptualism of the original text. A notable illustration will be found in the discussion of the validity of a gift over, at5 a remote
time, from one charity to another, or from a charity to an individual.
Something should be said about the appendices. In the third edition there
were thirteen of these, consisting in part of articles which the author had
written subsequent to the publication of the first edition. A fourteenth has
now been added. This is the editor's answer-a -very effective one-to
Professor Vance's criticism of Gray's statement as to the effect of Quia
Emptores on tenure.
Appendix C, legislative changes in regard to perpetuities in the United
States, is one of the most important parts of the book from the standpoint of
the practicing lawyer, particularly because he will not often find the constitutional and statutory provisions of his state regarding alienability and remoteness in vesting collected, indexed or annotated in such a way as to enable him
to deal with the subject rapidly and confidently. This appendix has been
extensively revised to take account of new statutory and case material.
Though doubled in size it still does not provide any such accurate and complete account of the law as to perpetuities in the various states as is achieved
for instance in respect to spendthrift trusts by Professor Griswold's text on
that subject. For example, in the section dealing with California no mention
is made of an important provision of the Civil Code which permits an executory limitation to be created upon a prior remainder in fee, contingent upon
the remainderman dying under 21, or upon some other event during the
minority of the remainderman. This section had never been construed until
a recent leading caseY which is perhaps of sufficient importance to have
deserved comment.
Full coverage of state materials might have been achieved by some cutting
and consolidation without expanding the book beyond the limits of a single
volume. Thus the detailed attention paid to many English cases was perhaps
justifiable when the author first wrote but not today in an American text,
in view of the number and range of cases in this country. The special essay
on determinable fees in Appendix E might well have been merged with
earlier text treatment of the same subject. Similarly Appendix F on future
interests in personal property might have been amalgamated with sections 7196 on personalty, more particularly as the editor has not brought down to
13§ 214, note 1.

14 See Bingbam, Legal Philosophy and the Law (1914) 9 ILL. L. REV. 98, 105 note 8.
15§ 603.1 et seq.
16CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering 1941) § 772.
NEstate of Harrison, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 28, 70 P. (2d) 522 (1937).
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date the footnote material of the appendix. However, the footnotes to this
appendix do happily preserve the famous Socratic dialogue between Gray
and an anonymous student as to future interests in a silver cup; and the
editor, stimulated no doubt by the engaging curiosity of Professor Leach 8
as to the identity of "that great man Mr. Pooley" whose shade is invoked by
the student in the course of the dialogue, now includes the identification of
Mr. Pooley-he turns out to have been an early 18th century barrister and
legal writer-in an annotation to the dialogue itself. But we search in vain
for any answer to Professor Leach's further query as to why Gray should
have placed in the mouth of his student interlocutor so recondite an oath. 19
One of the more considerable text contributions of the editor is the rewriting of Appendix H, "Gifts to Indefinite Persons for Non-charitable Purposes." Taking up trusts for unincorporated societies, the editor vigorously
combats the view of the Restatement of Trusts20 that an unincorporated group

may be considered as an entity capable itself of being the beneficiary of a trust.
Under this entity theory the trust would encounter no difficulty from the
doctrine of Morice v.'Bishop of Durham nor would there be any question
under the Rule against Perpetuities proper (i.e., as distinct from the allowable
'duration of the trust 21 ) since the entire equitable interest would be vested from
the start in the society. The editor, faithful as one might expect to commonlaw concepts, brands the entity theory as at best only a procedural device
and rejects it so far as substantive questions are concerned. 22 He is therefore
compelled to say that inany such non-charitable trust where the beneficiaries
are the members of the society from time to time, the equitable interests of
future members violate the Rule against Perpetuities and the trust should
fail.2

To this principle he makes an exception which is worth mentioning. He
says that if the members at any one time are able by unanimous vote to put
the trust property into their own pockets-even though the donor did not
contemplate any such action by the society-then for purposes of the Rule
against Perpetuities the entire interest may be considered as immediately
vested and the trust therefore unobjectionable under the Rule. 24 This would
in fact follow from the editor's earlier statement that "if the owner of the
present interest in property is at liberty to destroy a future interest, that
interest is not within the scope of the Rule against Perpetuities." 25 But are
the principle just quoted, and its application to a trust for an unincorporated
society, entirely consistent with Gray's major premise that the Rule is con-

cerned only with vesting and not with alienability? Admittedly in the case of
the society, ifthe immediate members do not combine to appropriate the trust
property, future members under the terms of the trust will acquire an in'sSee

LEACH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS

1'Ibid.

20RESTATEMIENT,
TRUSTS
2

§ 119.

1d. at § 119, Comment c.
22§ 896.2.

2§ 896.1.
24§ 896, and see § 896.2 and note 10 thereunder.
2 § 524.1.

(2d ed. 1940) 213, n. 12.
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terest. It is hard to see why the existence of an unexercised power to wipe
out future interests should save the latter from condemnation unless the Rule
takes into account the element of alienability. That in fact it does has been
ably argued from time to time2d and the editor might well have suggested a
modification of Gray's adamantine positionalong the lines laid down by Dean
Fraser in 1922.27

Such critical comments as I have ventured should of course not obscure
what was said at the start of this review, namely, that the fourth edition has
been very ably and conscientiously done. All students of the law are indebted
to the editor.
Lowell Turenthie*
Stanford University, Calif.

Military Law and Defense Legislation, By A. ARTHUR SCHILLER with a

foreword by Edward C. Betts. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1941. Pp.
xxxiv, 647.
This collection of material, intended for the student of military law, brings
home graphically the fact that legal rules affecting the war we are fighting
are not those best fitted for mid-twentieth century warfare. Antedating, in the
main, World War I, their function deserves critical examination. Much of
our military law dates back to the English law which the American Army
adopted in the Revolutionary War days. Many of the additions and changes
since then were made in times of peace. In addition they were directed to
the problem of an orderly procedure to regulate and control a small peacetime army. Hence they are hardly adapted to the army's present needs.
This volume adopts the currently fashionable modification of the case
method by interspersing cases with legislative and administrative material
and by printing abbreviated excerpts from the cases themselves which sometimes omit even the actual holdings of the particular case. The book is in-tended for two types of student, viz.: those who, as civilian lawyers, will
advise on questions touching the military, and those performing various functions in the army who will be concerned with its internal discipline. The
main divisions of the book can be grouped along these lines; the first, second
and fourth chapters dealing respectively with, "The Constitutional Extent
of Military Power", "Army of the United States" and "The Soldier's Civil
Rights" concern chiefly the lawyer not in service. "Military Law Proper"
(chapter 4) is designed for those who administer this phase of our armed
services. Of course this division is not exclusive, for the civilian lawyer may
represent the militarily accused and the military lawyer may be concerned
with the law as it determines the scope of proper military action; it, however, follows the pattern of the day-by-day work of the two.
Confining ourselves for the moment to military law proper: it is an inter26
See a review of the second edition in (1906) 19 HARV. L. REv. 635, and Fraser, The
of the Rile Against Perpetuities (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 560.
Rationale
27

Fraser, op. cit. supra note 26.
*Professor of Law, Stanford University.
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esting fact that this, which is the oldest branch of our administrative law
should be the most technical. This branch is as old as the United States.
In fact it is the only one expressly recognized by the United States Constitution. With this Constitutional basis it is odd that this type of administrative law should have kept its procedures so closely akin to those in use
by the courts. This historical accident is due to the fact that on the procedural side many military precedents occurred when civil and criminal procedure were less simplified than they now are and before the recent extensions of administrative law. On the substantive side military offenses
embrace so many categories that difficulty aises from the sheer number of
possible offenses. It embraces both the main criminal felonies without further
statutory definition, special military offenses (desertion, insubordination,
mutiny and the like), wartime offenses (misbehavior before the enemy, aiding the enemy, spying and similar offenses), miscellaneous crimes (drunk on
duty, frauds in connection with government property, etc.) and a general
catchall involving in the case of an officer "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman" and with an enlisted man "disorder and neglect to the
prejudice of good order and military discipline." The substantive uncertainties due to the piecemeal growth of military law could easily be eliminated
either by enactment of an express and detailed code of offenses or by entrusting more permanently established courts-martial with greater administrative
discretion than they now have. It is in its procedural aspects that our military law is ridiculous. The investigation which precedes trial is fully as
cumbersome as a grand jury indictment-the charges and specifications remind one of common law procedure. Similarly the trial proper-with challenges, special pleas, burden of proof, application of exclusionary rules of
evidence and other carbon copies of our criminal procedure seem foreign to
an administrative process. Professor Schiller presents the pertinent provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial concerning these procedural steps
together with some case authority and opinions of the Judge Advocate
General. Other administrative bodies, where all that is at stake is a method
of doing business or the rights of the particular group of employees, can
function, and in the main well, without such application of rules which had
their origin in jury trials. Surely the armed forces, with our whole national
existence dependent upon their success, can function without such timeconsuming technicalities. It would seem that the individual's rights are less,
not greater, where so much is at stake. While such rules and procedures are
probably justifiable in peace, there is a grave question whether they are not
a luxury the United States Army can ill afford during a full scale modern
war.
Regulations, mostly from the Manual for Courts-Martial, are presented
dealing with the findings, sentence, and the two, and sometimes three, separate administrative reviews in the nature of appeals to which an accused is
entitled. Such multi-review likewise seems a luxury that we cannot afford
either in actual combat or in the event of a national invasion-but the law
now provides for this and the lawyer should learn to use his tools! Another
peculiarity of military law results from the provisions in Article of War 43
and paragraph 78-d of the Manual for Courts-Martial which provide that if

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 28

a sufficient number of the members of a court-martial do not concur in a
finding of guilty, the finding must be made that the accused is not guilty.
Since the number which must concur for a finding of guilty varies from a
simple majority to unanimity, according to the gravity of the punishmenit,
this rule makes the court-martial in cases involving the more heinous offenses
enter a positive finding of not guilty as to an accused even though more
than a majority of the court were persuaded of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is a safeguard far beyond that given by a hung jury in an ordinary criminal case. Nowhere else in modern administrative law is the interest of the government considered less.
The sections of the book which concern the civilian lawyer most are those
which deal with the method through which military jurisdiction attaches. Of
particular interest in this group are the cases on conscription. Prior reviewers
have differed as to the propriety of treating this subject at length. One
reviewer says that the topic dealing with review of draft boards should be
given "more space than is given to it,"' 1 while another equally scholarly reviewer says "the emphasis on cases defining the scope of the local draft
boards' powers" does not seem justified 2 and speaks of it as of interest only
to those who "want out from the Army." We think the value of knowledge
as to the precise scope of the law in this respect cannot be overestimated.
Most of the cases stated in this section relate to World War I and the Civil
War drafts. Decided almost uniformly in favor of the government they
show that the discretion of the draft boards is in most cases final and that
review by habeas corpus will be successful only where hearings are denied
or no facts support the finding. This modern administrative treatment of
the civilian before induction seems so harsh that it furnishes a striking contrast to the tender safeguards later surrounding the soldier. How much these
latter exist on paper only, or are applied in but some instances, the writers
of this review are in no position to state. Nevertheless, the conclusion follows that civilian draft boards and civilian courts have done a better job with
the law entrusted to them than the Army has with the rules which it
administers.
Professor Schiller in combining these two aspects of our military law in
one book indicates the total problem (civilian and military) of our fight
against totalitarianism. In addition, the book includes selected cases and
other material on the soldiers' and sailors' civil relief acts. The importance
of these moratory provisions both now and when we have won the war is
apparent. They are rightly included in the book. Appendices give the Articles of War, Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, and the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.
This book is of help to the student in the classroom, the civilian lawyer,
who is most cases will lack ready reference to much of the material contained therein, and the judge advocate in the field. It will be of historical
interest if and when our military law is streamlined to meet the demands
of a modern military establishment in time of war. The legal scholar will
'Book Note (1942) 32 CoL. L. REv. ,178,180.
2Book Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1047.
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feel that an author so well qualified to write in this field should have interspersed throughout the book some of his thoughts on the ways in which
military law could be revised to make it better adapted to meet the problems of World War II.
James R. Withrow, Jr.*
Stanley Law Sabelt
New York, New York
*Member, New York Bar.
tMember, New York Bar.

